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Abstract—We analyze semidefinite relaxation-based locational
marginal prices (RLMPs) for real and reactive power in elec-
tricity markets. Our analysis reveals that when the nonconvex
economic dispatch problem has zero duality gap, the RLMPs
exhibit properties similar to locational marginal prices with
linearized power flow equations. When the duality gap is nonzero,
they behave similarly to convex hull prices. Restricted to radial
distribution networks, RLMPs reduce to second-order cone
relaxation-based distribution locational marginal prices that have
been previously proposed. These properties make RLMPs par-
ticularly attractive to design settlements of market participants
from market clearing with nonconvex power flow models.
I. INTRODUCTION
Organized wholesale electricity markets rely on a bid-based
security-constrained economic dispatch problem to compute
dispatch and pricing decisions. Specifically, prices are derived
as optimal dual multipliers of system constraints in the market
clearing problem. These locational marginal prices (LMPs),
proposed in [1], reflect marginal system costs to meet local
incremental demand. LMPs stand on sound economic prin-
ciples when the market-clearing problem is convex. Derived
with lossless linearized power flow models such as the popular
DC approximations (see [2]), LMPs exhibit several desirable
properties. For example, they adequately incentivize market
participants to follow the dispatch prescribed by the system
operator (SO). Moreover, the SO never runs cash-negative after
settling the payments with the market participants. See [3], [4]
for details.
The core model for settlement design via LMPs ignores key
properties of the power system. For example, using only the
LMP, a generation unit may not be able to recover its as-
bid cost including no-load and startup costs. Incorporation of
unit commitment decisions render the market clearing problem
nonconvex. In this case, there may not exist a set of nodally
uniform prices that support a market equilibrium, leading to
revenue shortages for generation units that subsequently re-
quire out-of-market payments by the SO for them to follow the
SO-prescribed dispatch. A long literature has emerged already
to tackle nonconvexities from unit commitment considerations,
e.g., see [5]–[10]. Unfortunately, such considerations do not
define the only source of nonconvexity in electricity pricing.
In this paper, we focus on price formation in electricity
markets with nonconvexities in the market clearing problem
that arise from an alternating current (AC) power flow model,
All authors are with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL 61801. Emails:
{annaw5, ndrio2, boses}@illinois.edu. We gratefully acknowledge the support
of Power Systems Engineering Research Center (PSERC). We also thank L.
Tong (Cornell) and A. Anaswamy (MIT) for insightful discussions.
which has received much less attention. Opposed to commit-
ment considerations, this nonconvexity is not a consequence
of the cost structures of assets, but rather stems from the
nature of the Kirchhoff’s laws that govern the underlying
power network. There is an increasing interest in the power
industry to efficiently and optimally solve the nonconvex
market clearing problem with AC power flow, e.g., see recent
efforts under the ongoing ARPA-E GO competition. As pricing
under AC power flow models is gaining traction [11], we are
motivated to design and analyze meaningful prices that can
accompany such a dispatch. To that end, we formulate the
economic dispatch problem with AC power flow equations
in Section II and derive electricity prices from optimal dual
multipliers of its convex semidefinite relaxation in Section III.
Linearized (real) power flow models such as DC approx-
imations or local linearizations around an operating point
have long been used to design prices in market environments.
Some of these models ignore losses and reactive power con-
siderations, making the settlement design somewhat divorced
from the physics of the power grid. Ad hoc measures to
incorporate losses are known to distort price signals, e.g., see
[12]. The motivation behind explicitly incorporating reactive
power in the pricing model is justified by two major trends.
Declining natural gas prices and environmental regulations
have caused baseload generation units that have historically
provided reactive power support (e.g. coal plants) to run at
economic loss or even plan retirement. Second, the deepening
penetration of distributed generation has increased focus on
ensuring reactive power capability exists given that high solar
generation requires more reactive power. These trends—which
are likely to continue—have resulted in substantial out-of-
market payments in energy uplift, e.g. PJM paid $199 million
in 2018 according to [13]. As the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) focuses on price formation and reactive
power compensation in the era of increasing renewable gener-
ation [14], the need to incorporate reactive power as explicit
product with transparent price signals becomes compelling. By
nature, our convex relaxation-based locational marginal prices
(RLMPs) can accommodate AC power flow models in their
full generality. As such, RLMPs assign prices to both real and
reactive power, bringing reactive power compensation into the
fold of competitive markets.
Semidefinite programming (SDP) based convex relaxation
of economic dispatch problems has its origins in [15]. Pop-
ularized by [16], it has been analyzed in great detail in
[17]–[22], among others. In this paper, we focus on RLMPs
derived from this SDP relaxation. In Section IV, we show
that RLMPs exhibit properties of LMPs when the duality
gap of the nonconvex economic dispatch problem vanishes.
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2Specifically, they incentivize market participants to follow the
SO prescribed dispatch and the SO remains solvent after set-
tling payments with the participants (under mild conditions).
When said duality gap is nonzero, the absence of a market
equilibrium may provide incentives for certain generators to
deviate from the SO prescribed dispatch signal. In such an
event, side payments become necessary, which are undesirable
for a number a reasons as highlighted in a recent order by
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) [23]. We
prove that RLMPs minimize a specific form of side payments
necessary to provide dispatch-following incentives to market
participants. These side payments are the sum of the lost
opportunity cost for the generators and the product revenue
shortfall, which arise due to network constraints. This result
bears a striking resemblance to the properties of convex hull
pricing (CHPs) that have been proposed and analyzed in
[8], [10], [24] to tackle nonconvexity due to commitment
decisions. RLMPs, on the other hand, handle the nonconvexity
that arises due to power flow equations.
The rapid proliferation of distributed energy resources
(DERs) in low and medium voltage distribution grids has
generated considerable interest in designing appropriate price
signals for distribution networks, e.g., see [25]–[28]. In con-
trast to the bulk power system, where linearized lossless
power flow models are often deemed acceptable, distribution
networks must explicitly account for reactive power flows
and voltage considerations. Our SDP-based pricing problem
restricted to radial (acyclic) distribution networks can be
solved as a second-order cone program (SOCP). We establish
in Section VI that our proposed RLMPs coincide with the
SOCP-based distribution locational marginal prices (DLMPs)
proposed in [29]. Such prices appropriately incorporate voltage
constraints and thus capture the economic value of providing
reactive power support at a particular location in the network.
Although [29] provides a thorough analysis of how congestion,
reactive power, and losses affect the formulation of DLMPs,
this paper supplements the work by explicitly justifying the
use of SOCP-based DLMPs from an economic standpoint.
We illustrate our theoretical findings through numerical exper-
iments. We conclude the paper in Section VII with potential
future research directions. Owing to space limitations, all
proofs are currently relegated to [30]; they will be added to
the final version, if the paper is accepted for publication.
II. THE MARKET CLEARING PROCEDURE
Consider a bid-based economic dispatch problem that a SO
can utilize to clear the market. In this work, we compute
the dispatch and the prices from two separate problems. To
describe the market clearing process, we first describe the
model for the power grid and the grid-tied assets.
A. Modeling the Grid
Consider an electric power network on n buses and m
transmission lines. Let V ∈ Cn denote the vector of nodal
voltage phasors, where C is the set of complex numbers.
Denote by yk`, the admittance of the line joining buses k and
`.
The current flowing from bus k towards an adjacent bus `
is given by (Vk − V`)yk`, yielding
pk` + iqk` = Vk(Vk − V`)HyHk` (1)
as the apparent power flow from bus k to bus `. The notation
uH stands for the conjugate transpose of u and i :=
√−1.
More succinctly, the above relation can be written as
pk` + iqk` = V
HΦk`V + iV
HΨk`V , (2)
where Φk` and Ψk` are n × n Hermitian matrices with all
zeros except the following entries
[Φk`]kk :=
1
2
(yk` + y
H
k`), [Φk`]k` = [Φk`]
H
`k := −
1
2
yk`,
[Ψk`]kk :=
1
2i
(yHk` − yk`), [Ψk`]k` := [Ψk`]H`k :=
1
2i
yk`.
The two summands in the right-hand-side (RHS) of (2)
define the real and reactive power flows from bus k to bus
`, respectively. Assume that the real power flows on the lines
are constrained as
pkl ≤ fk` (3)
for a flow limit fk` > 0. Such limits typically arise from
thermal considerations, but may also serve as proxies for
stability constraints.1 Assume that ykk is the shunt admittance
at bus k. Then, the apparent power injection at bus k becomes
pk + iqk = V
H
k Vky
H
kk +
∑
`∼k
(pk` + iqk`)
= V HΦkV + iV
HΨkV ,
where
Φk :=
1
2
(
ykk + y
H
kk
)
1k1
H
k +
∑
`∼k
Φk`,
Ψk :=
1
2i
(
yHkk − ykk
)
1k1
H
k +
∑
`∼k
Ψk`
and 1k ∈ Cn is the vector of all zeros, except the k-th entry
that is unity. The notation ` ∼ k indicates that a transmission
line connects buses ` and k in the power network. Voltage
magnitudes across the network are deemed to remain close to
rated voltage levels. We model such constraints at each bus k
as vk ≤ |Vk| ≤ vk that is equivalent to
v2k ≤ V H1k1HkV ≤ v2k. (4)
B. Modeling Grid Connected Assets
Consider two assets connected at each bus – an uncontrol-
lable asset whose apparent power draw is fixed and known and
a controllable asset whose power injection can vary within
known capacity limits. Let pDk and q
D
k , respectively, denote
the nominal real and reactive power draws at bus k from
the uncontrollable asset. Similarly, let pGk and q
G
k denote the
real and reactive power generation at bus k, respectively,
1Line flow constraints are often formulated over the apparent power flow as
p2k`+q
2
k` ≤ f2k`. These alternate formulations ultimately seek to constrain the
magnitude of the current flowing over the transmission line. The formulation
in (3) can alternately encode constraints on line current magnitudes.
3that vary within known capacity limits as pGk ∈ [pk, pk]
and qGk ∈ [qk, qk]. Associated with that generation is a
convex dispatch cost ck(pGk , q
G
k ). Assume henceforth that ck
is jointly convex in its arguments. Such costs in wholesale
markets are inferred from supply offers and demand bids.
Uncontrollable assets represent the collective inelastic power
demands at a bus. Generators and proxy demand resources
comprise controllable assets. There may be one, more than
one, or no controllable and uncontrollable assets at each bus,
but we assume one asset of each kind to simplify notation.
C. Market Clearing Problem with AC Power Flow Equations
The SO seeks to compute a dispatch that minimizes the
aggregate dispatch costs from the collection of grid-connected
controllable assets and meets the power requirements of the
uncontrollable ones, meeting the engineering constraints of the
power network as follows.
PAC : minimize
n∑
k=1
ck(p
G
k , q
G
k ),
subject to pGk − pDk = V HΦkV , (5a)
qGk − qDk = V HΨkV , (5b)
V HΦk`V ≤ fk`, (5c)
p
k
≤ pGk ≤ pk, qk ≤ qGk ≤ qk, (5d)
v2k ≤ V H1k1HkV ≤ v2k (5e)
for k = 1, . . . , n, ` ∼ k
over the variables pG, qG and V . The boldfaced symbols
collect the corresponding variables across the network. In PAC,
(5a) and (5b) enforce the power balance at each bus, (5c)
limits the power flows over each transmission line, (5d) defines
capacity limits for the power production from dispatchable
assets, and finally, (5e) defines bounds on voltage magnitudes.
The above market clearing problem is an instance of an
optimal power flow (OPF) problem with AC power flow.
PAC is nonconvex, owing to quadratic equalities. In the next
section, we ask: how should we price such a dispatch?
III. RELAXATION-BASED LOCATIONAL MARGINAL PRICES
We associate nodal prices to real and reactive powers based
on a semidefinite programming (SDP) based convex relaxation
of PAC in PSDP in (6) that seeks to optimize the same objective
function as PAC, but over a convex superset of the feasible set
of PAC. To arrive at the relaxation, notice that
V HMV = Tr(MV V H) = Tr(MW )
for any M ∈ Cn×n and W = V V H. Here, Tr stands for
the trace operator. The above representation reduces quadratic
forms in V to linear forms in W ∈ Cn×n. Also, any W that
admits the representation W = V V H is a rank-1 positive
semidefinite matrix (henceforth denoted W  0). Therefore,
one can reformulate PAC by replacing all quadratic forms in
V by linear expressions in W and enforce W to be a rank-
1 positive semidefinite matrix. This reformulation encodes
the nonconvexity of PAC in the rank constraint. Drop this
constraint to arrive at the following SDP relaxation of PAC:
PSDP : minimize
n∑
k=1
ck(p
G
k , q
G
k ),
subject to pGk − pDk = Tr(ΦkW ), (6a)
qGk − qDk = Tr(ΨkW ), (6b)
Tr(Φk`W ) ≤ fk`, (6c)
p
k
≤ pGk ≤ pk, qk ≤ qGk ≤ qk, (6d)
v2k ≤ Tr(1k1HkW ) ≤ v2k, (6e)
W  0, (6f)
for k = 1, . . . , n, ` ∼ k
over the variables W ,pG, qG. For any variable z in PSDP,
we use the notation z? to denote z at an optimum.
We now define prices using the optimal Lagrange multipli-
ers from PSDP. The prices we advocate are locational in nature,
i.e., they vary based on location within the power network.
However, the prices are uniform across assets connected at
the same bus. Towards that goal, associate the multipliers λpk
and λqk to the real and reactive power balance constraints in
(6a) and (6b), respectively. Similarly, associate µk` to the
one in (6c). Assign µpk, µ
p
k
to the upper and lower limits,
respectively, on the real power generation in (6d), and µqk, µ
q
k
to the respective limits on the reactive power generation in
(6d). Define µvk, µ
v
k
, respectively, as the multipliers for the
upper and lower bounds on voltage magnitudes in (6e). Finally,
associate the matrix U ∈ Cn×n as the multiplier for (6f).
Definition 1 (Relaxation-based Locational Marginal Prices
(RLMP)). Define λp,?k and λ
q,?
k , the optimal Lagrange mul-
tipliers from PSDP for the real and reactive power balance
constraints at bus k, respectively, as the prices for real and
reactive power at bus k.
The market proceeds as follows. The SO collects bids and
offers from market participants and solves the market clearing
problem PAC to compute the dispatch decisions pG,? and qG,?.
Then, the SO solves PSDP and computes the optimal Lagrange
multipliers λp,? and λq,? as the RLMPs. Under our pricing
scheme, the controllable asset at bus k produces pG,?k and q
G,?
k
and collects the payment
piGk := λ
p,?
k p
G,?
k + λ
q,?
k q
G,?
k
from the SO. Further, the uncontrollable asset with its demand
pDk and q
D
k pays
piDk := λ
p,?
k p
D
k + λ
q,?
k q
D
k
to the SO. We devote the next section to the derivation of
crucial properties of RLMPs that lend credence to this design.
IV. PROPERTIES OF RLMPS
What justifies RLMPs for price formation in electricity
markets? We describe a wishlist of properties for market
mechanisms in Section IV-A and argue through our main result
in Theorem 1 in Section IV-B that RLMPs exhibit a number of
these desirable properties, thus providing the rationale behind
our proposed mechanism.
4A. Desirable Qualities of Market Mechanisms
1) Efficient Market Equilibrium: The dispatch is said to be
efficient and clears the market, if it optimally solves PAC. It
is individually rational, if the SO prescribed dispatch indeed
maximizes the profit of a controllable asset, given the prices.
Said mathematically, the dispatch
(
pG,?k , q
G,?
k
)
must solve
maximize
pGk ,q
G
k
λp,?k p
G
k + λ
q,?
k q
G
k − ck(pGk , qGk ),
subject to p
k
≤ pGk ≤ pk, qk ≤ qGk ≤ qk,
(7)
given
(
λp,?k , λ
q,?
k
)
. A controllable asset then has no incentive
to deviate from its prescribed dispatch, given the prices. A
pricing scheme is nodally uniform if all assets connected at
a bus pay or are paid at the same price. Thus, co-located
assets do not have incentives to trade amongst themselves. A
market mechanism supports an efficient market equilibrium if
the dispatch is efficient, clears the market, and is individually
rational, given nodally uniform prices.
2) Revenue Adequacy: A market mechanism is revenue
adequate if the rents collected from power sales are enough
to cover the rents payable to suppliers, i.e., the merchandising
surplus defined as
MS :=
n∑
k=1
(
piGk − piDk
)
(8)
is nonnegative. Nonnegativity of MS ensures the solvency of
the SO after each market clearing.
3) Side Payment Minimization: When the dispatch mecha-
nism incorporates nonconvexities, it is typically challenging to
find a set of nodally uniform prices that adequately incentivize
all assets to follow the SO-prescribed dispatch. The SOs then
provide side-payments to controllable assets to deter possible
deviations. Such payments are often socialized among end-
use customers. Ideally, the market mechanism should minimize
such out-of-market settlements in aggregate to increase market
transparency. Lost opportunity costs constitute a specific form
of side-payment, defined as
LOC(λp,λq) :=
n∑
k=1
pioptk (λ
p
k, λ
q
k)− piSOk (λpk, λqk), (9)
where pioptk (λ
p
k, λ
q
k) is the optimal cost of (7) with
(
λp,?k , λ
q,?
k
)
replaced with (λpk, λ
q
k) and
piSOk (λ
p
k, λ
q
k) := λ
p
kp
G,?
k + λ
q
kq
G,?
k − ck(pG,?k , qG,?k ). (10)
Said differently, given the electricity prices, piSOk denotes the
profit of the controllable asset at bus k from following the
SO prescribed dispatch, while pioptk is the maximum profit that
asset can garner.
B. Main Result
Having described the qualities we seek in a market mech-
anism, we now characterize the properties of RLMPs in
Theorem 1, the proof of which relies on duality theory
of semidefinite programming. Assume throughout that PSDP
satisfies Slater’s condition. To present the result, we need the
following definition.
PRS(µ,µv,µv,U)
:= V H,?UV ? +
m∑
k`=1
µk`
(
fk` − V H,?Φk`V ?
)
+
n∑
k=1
µvk
(
v2k − |V ?k |2
)
+
n∑
k=1
µv
k
(|V ?k |2 − v2k)
(11)
for µ ≥ 0,µv ≥ 0,µv ≥ 0,U  0 as the product revenue
shortfall, where V ? constitutes an optimal solution of PAC.
Theorem 1. PSDP is the dual of the dual problem of PAC,
and the duality gap of PAC is given by
minimum
λp,λq,U ,
µ,µv,µv
LOC (λp,λq) + PRS(µ,µv,µv,U),
subject to U =
n∑
k=1
λpkΦk +
n∑
k=1
λqkΨk +
m∑
k`=1
µk`Φk`
+
n∑
k=1
(
µvk − µvk
)
1k1
H
k ,
µ ≥ 0, µv ≥ 0, µv ≥ 0, U  0.
When the duality gap is zero (rank W ? = 1 in PSDP), then
the proposed market mechanism supports an efficient market
equilibrium. Moreover, if the voltage lower limit constraint is
non-binding at all buses, i.e., Tr(1k1TkW
?) > v2k for k =
1, . . . , n, then the mechanism is revenue adequate.
The fact that PSDP is the double dual of PAC is well-known,
e.g., see [16], [31]. We include it in the result for completeness.
In addition, its proof provides the ideal setup to derive the rest
of the result.
Theorem 1 reveals that when the duality gap is nonzero,
RLMPs seek to minimize the sum of two terms that are
individually nonnegative–the lost opportunity cost (LOC) and
the product revenue shortfall (PRS), very similar in spirit to
convex hull pricing (CHP). See [10], [24] for comparison.
Having LOC as a component implies that RLMP in a way
attempts to minimize side payments necessary to incentivize
controllable assets to follow the SO’s dispatch signals, thereby
increasing market transparency. The economic interpretation of
PRS remains challenging – a feature that is again common to
both RLMP and CHP. A nonzero PRS can give rise to counter-
intuitive situations where prices can be positive even with non-
binding constraints. For example, one can end up with µ?k` > 0
from PSDP together with fk` > V H,?Φk`V ? from PAC. In
such an event, the SO will garner congestion revenue, even
when the line may not be congested at an optimal dispatch.
This again is a property that CHP exhibits. Notice that PRS
in (11) collects terms that appear in complementary slackness
conditions for PAC. However, the primal and the dual variables
come from two different problems. Thus, when the duality gap
is nonzero, one cannot expect the complementary slackness-
like condition to hold. Theorem 1 indicates that RLMP tries
to force PRS towards zero, similar in spirit to CHP. These
parallels between CHP and RLMP are not surprising, given
5that both advocate pricing based on the dual (or the double
dual) of the nonconvex market clearing problem, albeit to
tackle two different kinds of nonconvexities. Understanding
how RLMPs compare to the optimal dual multipliers of a local
optimum of the dispatch problem is an interesting subject for
future research.
When the duality gap is zero, Theorem 1 establishes that
RLMPs have similar properties as LMPs. No controllable asset
has incentive to deviate from the dispatch described by the
optimal solution of PAC. Under the additional condition of
non-binding lower bounds for voltage constraints at each bus,
the payments from uncontrollable assets cover the rents of
those that are controllable. Given the strong coupling between
reactive power injection and voltage magnitudes, one expects
nonnegative MS with adequate reactive power support. Our
numerical experiments in Section V illustrate that non-binding
lower voltage constraints are sufficient but not necessary for
revenue adequacy.
C. Practical Considerations for Market Adoption
RLMPs associate prices for real and reactive power, thereby
making reactive power compensation a part of competitive
market processes. Creation of markets for reactive power has
led to celebrated debates in the last two decades, e.g., see
[32]–[34]. Reactive power is alleged to not ‘travel too far’
and hence, a market is often deemed unnecessary. However,
real and reactive power are intimately coupled with each other
through the power flow equations. Therefore, pricing one and
not the other ignores that coupling. Inadequate reactive power
resources, especially under line/generator failure scenarios
(contingencies), can lead to brown and blackouts (see [35]). To
keep the notation simple, we have not modeled contingencies
in formulating PAC/PSDP. That extension, however does not
offer any conceptual difficulties. With such an extension, a
competitive market for both real and reactive power will
systematize the procurement process for both.
Pricing via RLMPs requires the SO to solve PSDP. SDPs
are known to scale poorly with problem dimension and pose
serious algorithmic challenges to possible adoption of RLMPs.
The difficulty typically arises from the need to solve large
linear system of equations within interior-point methods to
solve PSDP that require O(n3) operations. Such scaling is
prohibitive for practical power systems. In [18], [21], it has
been shown that PSDP can be equivalently formulated in terms
of semidefinite matrices corresponding to maximal cliques of
chordal extensions of the sparse power network graph. The
size of the largest maximal clique then determines the size
of the semidefinite matrices involved in the computational
step, and also the size of the linear systems solved at each
iteration. In other words, the sparsity of the power network
allows orders of magnitude speedups in algorithms for PSDP.
While algorithms to solve PSDP have come a long way (see
[22], [36]), additional research is required to make it scalable
for market adoption. Surprisingly enough, CHPs have faced
the same difficulty in tractable computation, although for a
completely different reason (see [7], [8]).
There are additional concerns in adopting RLMPs for day-
ahead markets. Algorithms for market clearing with linearized
power flows and unit commitment decisions leads to mixed-
integer linear programs (MILPs). Software for MILP is much
more mature than the nonlinear counterpart (see [37]). Thus,
adoption of RLMP for day-ahead markets will impose a heavy
computational burden on market clearing software. In addition,
one needs a way to enhance RLMP to price commitment
decisions–a topic we are eager to pursue in future work.
V. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
In this section, we report results from numerical experi-
ments on different power network examples to illustrate the
behavior of RLMPs as well as to discuss main insights from
our theoretical results. In our first experiment, we compute
the RLMPs on the IEEE 30-bus test system adopted from
Matpower, developed by [38]. Reactive power demands are
computed from the real power demands, assuming a lagging
power factor of 0.9. The resulting RLMPs for real and reactive
power across the network are illustrated through heatmaps
in Figures 1a and 1b respectively. An increase in real and
reactive power demands at buses 29 and 30 demonstrate the
locational nature of these prices. In particular, once the real
power demand on bus 30 exceeds the flow limit on branch 29-
30, the prices for both real and reactive power at buses 29 and
30 significantly exceed those at other locations in the network,
as Figures 1c and 1d reveal. In effect, these prices reflect
that in the presence of congestion it becomes more expensive
to supply demand at buses 29 and 30. We then narrow the
voltage magnitude limits on a subset of nodes; the effect on
RLMPs is illustrated in Figures 1e and 1f for real and reactive
power prices, respectively. The impact is significantly larger
on reactive power prices than on real power prices. Intuitively,
maintaining the voltage level within acceptable bounds across
the network requires sufficient injections of reactive power
in the appropriate locations on the network. Thus, enforcing
stricter voltage limits, increases demand for reactive power
injections and therefore their RLMPs.
To offer further insights into the properties of RLMP, we
conduct a case study on a three-bus power network example
for our second experiment. The network has generators and
demands at each bus that are connected via three transmission
lines with identical parameters f , r, x. Assume quadratic costs
of the form ck(pGk , q
G
k ) := C
2
k
(
pGk
)2
+C1kp
G
k at each bus k. We
study four cases, parameters for which are recorded in Table
I. In addition, we set pG
k
= qG
k
= 0 for all buses throughout.
For the first three cases we consider, PSDP, solved via CVX
in MATLAB (see [39]), is exact with rank W ? = 1. In our
first experiment, the voltage lower limit at bus 3 binds, thus
violating the sufficient condition in Theorem 1 for revenue
adequacy, and we obtain MS < 0. In the second case we study,
voltage lower limits do not bind at any bus. Indeed, we obtain a
nonnegative MS, as Theorem 1 dictates. For the third case, the
lower limit on voltage magnitude binds at bus 2. Yet, we obtain
MS > 0, indicating that our criterion identified in Theorem 1
for revenue adequacy is sufficient but not necessary. PSDP is
not exact in the fourth case with rank W ? = 2. We obtain
pG,? = (0.97, 2.20, 0)
ᵀ
, qG,? = (1.09, 1.20, 1.26)
ᵀ
,
λp,? = (10.06, 1.58, 11.52)
ᵀ
, λq,? = (0, 0, 0)
ᵀ
,
6(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Fig. 1: Plots (a), (b) show heatmaps of RLMP on the 30-bus IEEE
network. Plots (c), (d) are derived with pD26 = 7.5, qD26 = 3.3, pD29 =
12.2, qD29 = 4.9, pD30 = 16.1, and qD30 = 5.9. Plots (e), (f) are derived
with vk = 0.99, vk = 1.01 for k = 24, . . . , 30. Prices are in $/MWh.
where PAC is solved via Matpower. The solution of PAC
is verified to be a local optimal solution; global optimal-
ity remains difficult to certify. Furthermore, we calculate
piSO2 (λ
p,?
2 , λ
q,?
2 ) = 0.79 and pi
opt
2 (λ
p,?
2 , λ
q,?
2 ) = 0.84. Thus,
price at bus 2 for this case does not adequately incentivize
the generator at that bus to follow the SO-prescribed dispatch.
It needs a side-payment to do so. Theorem 1 indicates that
RLMP seeks to minimize such side-payments.
VI. APPLICATION TO DISTRIBUTION LOCATIONAL
MARGINAL PRICES
Despite progress in wholesale electricity markets, the low-
voltage distribution grid has been largely excluded from day-
ahead and real-time markets. The role of distribution grids
is largely passive with commercial and residential customers
exposed to fixed or time-of-use rates that do not reflect real
time conditions of the system. However, rapid proliferation of
distributed energy resources (DERs) and the aim to harness
demand flexibility of end-use customers have motivated re-
search in defining appropriate price signals for compensating
energy transactions in distribution networks. e.g., see [25], [29]
and [26]. Suggested distribution LMPs (DLMPs) aim to reflect
the locational value of DERs and physics of the network as
discussed in [40] and [41]. We argue that RLMPs from PSDP
become the second-order cone programming (SOCP) based
DLMPs in [29] over radial (acyclic) distribution grids.
Throughout this section, assume that the power network is
acyclic, represented as a directed graph (N,E), where N is the
set of nodes and E the set of all directed edges. Ignore shunt
admittances for simplicity and include any capacitor banks as
constant VAR sources. Denote by k → `, a directed edge from
bus k to bus `. Define 1yk` := rk` + ixk` as the impedance of
line k → ` and consider the following SOCP problem.
PSOCP : minimize
n∑
k=1
ck(p
G
k , q
G
k ),
subject to pGk − pDk =
∑
`′:k→`′
Pk`′
−
∑
`′:`′→k
(P`′k − r`′kJ`′k) , (12a)
qGk − qDk =
∑
`′:k→`′
Qk`′
−
∑
`′:`′→k
(Q`′k − xk`′J`′k) , (12b)
Pk` ≤ fk`, rk`Jk` − Pk` ≤ fk`, (12c)
p
k
≤ pGk ≤ pk, qk ≤ qGk ≤ qk, (12d)
v2k ≤ wk ≤ v2k, (12e)
w` = wk − 2(Pk`rk` +Qk`xk`)
+ (r2k` + x
2
k`)Jk`, (12f)
P 2k` +Q
2
k` ≤ Jk`wk (12g)
for k ∈ N, k → ` ∈ E
over the variables pG, qG,w,P ,Q,J . All constraints in the
above problem are linear except (12g) that is a second-order
cone constraint. In fact, the inequality in (12g) replaced by an
equality amounts to a reformulation of PAC. The inequality
potentially expands the feasible set of PAC, making PSOCP
a convex relaxation of PAC. When solved with an equality
in (12g), the variables Pk` and Qk` denote the sending-end
real and reactive powers from bus k towards bus `. Then, Jk`
becomes the squared current magnitude on that line. Finally,
wk equals the squared voltage magnitude at bus k. The SOCP-
based relaxation presented above utilizes the so-called branch
flow model of Kirchhoff’s laws over a distribution network,
and has been extensively analyzed by [42], [43] and [44].
Associate Lagrange multipliers Λpk and Λ
q
k with (12a) and
(12b), and their collections across the network as Λp and
Λq , respectively. The following result establishes the equality
between prices derived from PSDP and PSOCP.
Theorem 2. For a radial power network, the set of optimal
Lagrange multipliers Λp,?, Λq,? of PSOCP equal the set of
optimal Lagrange multipliers λp,?, λq,? of PSDP.
Said differently, RLMPs restricted to radial networks coin-
cides with DLMPs proposed in [29]. Such prices are locational
in nature and compensate market participants for both real and
reactive power. Theorem 2 provides the economic rationale
7Case f r x k pDk q
D
k p
G
k q
G
k v
2
k v
2
k C
1
k C
2
k w
?
k MS
1 0.79 0.50 2.0 0.90 0.95 0.98 10 1.0 0.98
1 0.24 0.01 0.01 2 0 0 1.2 0.21 0.98 1.01 10 1.0 0.99 -2.44
3 1.90 0 2.0 2.00 0.99 1.01 10 1.0 0.99
1 0.79 0.50 2.0 0.90 0.95 1.05 10 1.0 1.01
2 0.50 0.01 0.01 2 0 0 1.2 0.21 0.98 1.01 10 1.0 1.01 0.71
3 2.00 0 2.0 2.00 0.99 1.01 10 1.0 1.00
1 0.79 0.50 2.0 0.90 1.01 1.05 10 1.0 1.01
3 0.50 0.01 0.01 2 0 0 1.2 0.21 0.98 1.01 10 1.0 1.01 0.17
3 2.00 0 2.0 2.00 0.99 1.01 10 1.0 1.00
1 1.10 1.00 1.0 2.0 0.98 1.01 10 0.1 1.01
4 0.90 0.03 0.75 2 1.10 1.00 3.0 2.0 0.99 1.01 1 0.1 1.01 16.04
3 0.95 1.00 0 2.0 0.95 1.02 0 0 0.95
TABLE I: Parameter choices and outcomes of the case studies on the three-bus power network.
behind the proposed DLMPs: they (i) support efficient market
equilibria, (ii) ensure revenue adequacy and (iii) satisfy side-
payment minimization when the SOCP relaxation is not exact.
Our exposition focuses on the mathematical foundations
of DLMPs and sidesteps a range of issues surrounding the
adoption of such prices in practice. For example, what is the
right trading platform that needs to be established and what
products should be traded in such platforms that DERs can
participate in? How should such platforms coordinate their
operations with wholesale markets governed by transmission
system operators? See [45] and [46] for insightful discussions
on the same. We align with the view in [27] to consider a
retail market operated by an independent distribution system
operator (DSO) responsible for the dispatch and pricing of
DERs, but leave the specifics of a coordinated wholesale-retail
market design to a future effort. Finally, note that we have
modeled the distribution network as a single-phase equivalent
of a balanced three-phase circuit. Extension of our work to
consider multi-phase unbalanced distribution grids remains an
interesting direction for future research.
Figure 2 shows DLMPs on a 15-bus radial network from
[29] with the modification pD11 = 0.250 and q
D
11 = 0.073,
reproduced from our preliminary work in [47]. Duality gap
was found to be zero in all experiments. Indeed, Figures 2c, 2d
reveal that increasing power demands at bus 11 increases real
power prices around bus 11, illustrating the locational nature
of these prices, similar to those in Figure 1. Also, Figures 2e,2f
demonstrate that voltage limits significantly affect reactive
power prices. Our experiments with various parameters for
this example always yielded MS ≥ 0.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this paper, we addressed the question: what price signals
are deemed meaningful for market clearing with AC power
flow? We proposed and analyzed relaxation-based locational
marginal prices (RLMPs) for real and reactive power, based on
optimal dual multipliers of the SDP relaxation of the market
clearing problem. We showed that when the duality gap of the
market clearing problem is zero, RLMPs support an efficient
market equilibrium and the mechanism is revenue adequate
under mild conditions – properties that are reminiscent of
LMPs defined with linear power flow models. With nonzero
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Fig. 2: Plots (a), (b) show heatmaps of DLMPs on the 15-bus radial
network adopted from [29]. Plots (c), (d) are derived with pD11 =
0.350, and (e), (f) with v2i = 1.05, i = 0, . . . , 10, v
2
1 = 1. Arrows
indicate edge directions considered in PSOCP.
duality gap, we proved that RLMPs possess properties similar
to convex hull prices. We also demonstrated that RLMPs
adapted to acyclic distribution networks define distribution
LMPs (DLMPs) prorposed in the literature.
There are several interesting directions for future research.
First, we plan to study extensions of RLMPs to price commit-
ment decisions to create a complete recipe for price formation
in electricity markets with all sources of nonconvexities con-
sidered within market clearing. Second, we aim to explore
extensions of electricity derivatives such as financial transmis-
sion rights with RLMPs and analyze their properties along the
lines of [4]. Third, we hope to extend the properties of RLMPs
to three-phase, unbalanced distribution networks.
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9APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1.
The proof proceeds in four steps. We first show that the
dual program of PAC coincides with the dual of PSDP. Next,
we compute the duality gap of PAC. We find that the duality
gap constitutes of two terms: the LOC and PRS. When the
relaxation is exact or equivalently when rank W ? = 1, we
show that prices defined as the Langrange of PSDP support
an efficient market equilibrium. Moreover, when the voltage
lower bound is inactive, revenue adequacy is of the SO is
guaranteed.
Step 1. Proving that dual programs of PAC and PSDP
coincide. Define the partial Lagrangian of PAC as
LV (pG, qG,V ,λp,λq,µ,µv,µv) :=
n∑
k=1
ck(p
G
k , q
G
k )
−
n∑
k=1
λpk
(
pGk − pDk − V HΦkV
)
−
n∑
k=1
λqk
(
qGk − qDk − V HΨkV
)
+
m∑
k`=1
µk`
(
V HΦk`V − fk`
)
+
n∑
k=1
µvk
(
V H1k1
H
kV − v2k
)
−
n∑
k=1
µv
k
(
V H1k1
H
kV − v2k
)
,
and the set S as
S :=
{(
pG, qG
) | p ≤ pG ≤ p, q ≤ qG ≤ q} . (15)
Then, the dual program of PAC is given by
maximize
λp,λq,
µ,µv,µv
minimum
V ,
(pG,qG)∈S
LV (pG, qG,V ,λp,λq,µ,µv,µv),
subject to µ ≥ 0, µv ≥ 0, µv ≥ 0.
(16)
In the above problem, the inner minimization with respect to
V amounts to minimizing V HUV , where
U :=
n∑
k=1
λpkΦk +
n∑
k=1
λqkΨk +
m∑
k`=1
µk`Φk` +
n∑
k=1
(
µvk − µvk
)
1k1
H
k
(17)
It equals −∞ unless U  0. Thus, (16) can be written as
maximize
λp,λq,U,
µ,µv,µv
minimum
(pG,qG)∈S
n∑
k=1
[
ck(p
G
k , q
G
k )− λpkpGk − λqkqGk
]
+
n∑
k=1
(
λpkp
D
k + λ
q
kq
D
k
)
−
m∑
k`=1
µk`fk`
−
n∑
k=1
(
µvkv
2
k − µvkv
2
k
)
,
subject to µ ≥ 0, µv ≥ 0, µv ≥ 0, U  0, (17).
(18)
A partial Lagrangian function for PSDP is given by
LW (pG, qG,W ,λp,λq,µ,µv,µv,U) :=
n∑
k=1
ck(p
G
k , q
G
k )
−
n∑
k=1
λpk
(
pGk − pDk − Tr(ΦkW )
)
− Tr(UW )
−
n∑
k=1
λqk
(
qGk − qDk − Tr(ΨkW )
)
+
n∑
k=1
µk` (Tr(Φk`W )− fk`)
+
n∑
k=1
µvk
(
Tr(1k1HkW )− v2k
)
−
n∑
k=1
µv
k
(
Tr(1k1HkW )− v2k
)
,
using which the dual program of PSDP can be written as
maximize
λp,λq,U
µ,µv,µv
minimum
W ,
(pG,qG)∈S
LW (pG, qG,W ,λp,λq,µ,µv,µv,U),
subject to µ ≥ 0, µv ≥ 0, µv ≥ 0, U  0.
(19)
Solve the inner minimization over W , i.e., equate the partial
derivative of LW with respect to W to zero to get (17).
Incorporation of (17) as a constraint in (19) yields (18),
proving that the dual programs of PAC and PSDP coincide.
Step 2. Computing the duality gap. Recall that (18)
defines the common dual program of PAC and PSDP. With
Slater’s condition, strong duality holds for PSDP, and hence,
the optimal cost of PSDP is the same as that of (18). Call this
cost c?SDP.
Next, consider an optimal solution
(
pG,?, qG,?,V ?
)
of
PAC with an optimal cost
c?AC =
n∑
k=1
ck
(
pG,?k , q
G,?
k
)
. (20)
Then, the nodal demands satisfy
pDk = p
G,?
k − V H,?ΦkV ?, qDk = qG,?k − V H,?ΨkV ?. (21)
Utilizing (20) and (21), the objective function in (18) can be
written as
c?AC +
n∑
k=1
[
ck(p
G
k , q
G
k )− λpkpGk − λqkqGk
]
+
n∑
k=1
[
λpkp
G,?
k + λ
q
kq
G,?
k − ck(pG,?k , qG,?k )
]
−
m∑
k`=1
µk`fk` +
n∑
k=1
(
µv
k
v2k − µvkv2k
)
−
n∑
k=1
[
λpkV
H,?ΦkV
? + λqkV
H,?ΨkV
?
]
,
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• Primal feasibility conditions: (6a) – (6f).
• Dual feasibility: µp,?k , µ
p,?
k
, µq,?k , µ
q,?
k
, µ?k`, µ
v,?
k , µ
v,?
k
≥ 0, for k = 1, . . . , n, k` = 1, . . . , 2m, U?  0.
• Gradient conditions: For k = 1, ..., n, (k`) = 1, ...,m:
n∑
k=1
λp,?k Φk +
n∑
k=1
λq,?k Ψk +
m∑
k`=1
µ?k`Φk` +
n∑
k=1
µv,?k 1k1
T
k −
n∑
k=1
µv,?
k
1k1
T
k −U? = 0, (13a)
∇pG
k
[
ck(p
G,?
k , q
G,?
k )
]
− λp,?k + µp,?k − µp,?k = ∇qGk
[
ck(p
G,?
k , q
G,?
k )
]
− λq,?k + µq,?k − µq,?k = 0. (13b)
• Complementary slackness conditions: For k = 1, ..., n, (k`) = 1, ...,m:
Tr(U?W ?) = µ?k`[Tr(Φk`W
?)− fk`] = µvk
(
Tr(1k1HkW
?)− v2k
)
= µv
k
(
Tr(1k1HkW
?)− v2k
)
= 0, (14a)
µq,?
k
(
qG,?k − qGk
)
= µq,?k
(
qG,?k − qGk
)
= µp,?
k
(
pG,?k − pGk
)
= µp,?k
(
pG,?k − pGk
)
= 0. (14b)
Fig. 3: Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions for PSDP.
that using the notation in (10) allows us to rearrange (18) as
c?AC − c?SDP = −maximum
λp,λq,U
µ,µv,µv
n∑
k=1
[
−piopt(λpk, λqk) + piSOk (λpk, λqk)
]
−
m∑
k`=1
µk`fk` +
n∑
k=1
(
µv
k
v2k − µvkv2k
)
−
n∑
k=1
[
λpkV
H,?ΦkV
? + λqkV
H,?ΨkV
?
]
,
subject to µ ≥ 0, µv ≥ 0, µv ≥ 0, U  0, (17)
= minimum
λp,λq,
µ,µv,µv
LOC (λp,λq) + η(λp,λq,µ,µv,µv,U)
subject to µ ≥ 0, µv ≥ 0, µv ≥ 0, U  0, (17),
where η is given by
η(λp,λq,µ,µv,µv,U) :=
m∑
k`=1
µk`fk` −
n∑
k=1
(
µv
k
v2k − µvkv2k
)
+
n∑
k=1
λpkV
H,?ΦkV
? +
n∑
k=1
λqkV
H,?ΨkV
?.
It remains to show that η indeed equals PRS. To that end,
utilize the definition of U in (17) to get
η(λp,λq,µ,µv,µv,U) =
m∑
k`=1
µk`fk` −
n∑
k=1
(
µv
k
v2k − µvkv2k
)
+ V H,?UV ? −
m∑
k`=1
µk`V
H,?Φk`V
? −
n∑
k=1
(
µvk − µvk
)
V H,?1k1
H
kV
?
=
m∑
k`=1
µk`fk` −
n∑
k=1
(
µv
k
v2k − µvkv2k
)
+ V H,?UV ?
−
m∑
k`=1
µk`p
?
k` −
n∑
k=1
(
µvk − µvk
)
|Vk|2
= PRS
(
µ,µv,µv,U
)
,
where the last line follows from the definition of PRS in (11).
This completes the derivation of the duality gap of PAC.
Step 3. Establishing efficient market equilibrium. Both
LOC and PRS are, by definition, nonnegative. Therefore, zero
duality gap implies LOC (λp,?,λq,?) = 0, which in turn means
piSOk
(
λp,?k , λ
q,?
k
)
= pioptk
(
λp,?k , λ
q,?
k
)
for each bus k. Thus, individual rationality holds for each
controllable asset. Let
(
pG,?, qG,?,W ?
)
describe an optimal
solution of PSDP with rank W ? = 1. Factorize W ? into
V ?V H,?. Then,
(
pG,?, qG,?,V ?
)
is an optimal solution of
PAC. Together with individual rationality condition, it implies
that the mechanism supports an efficient market equilibrium.
Step 4. Proving revenue adequacy. With zero duality gap,
recall that the dispatch and the prices can both be obtained
from PSDP. The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality con-
ditions for PSDP are given in Figure 3, from which we simplify
MS =
n∑
k=1
λp,?k
(
pDk − pG,?k
)
+
n∑
k=1
λq,?k
(
qDk − qG,?k
)
= −
n∑
k=1
λp,?k Tr(ΦkW
?)− λq,?k Tr(ΨkW ?) (22a)
=
m∑
k`=1
µ?k`Tr(Φk`W
?) +
n∑
k=1
µv,?k Tr(1k1
T
kW
?)
−
n∑
k=1
µv,?
k
Tr(1k1TkW
?)− Tr(U?W ?) (22b)
=
m∑
k`=1
µ?k`fk` +
n∑
k=1
µv,?k v
2
k −
n∑
k=1
µv,?
k
v2k. (22c)
Here, (22a) follows from primal feasibility condition, (22b)
follows from (13a), and (22c) follows from (14a). If the
lower voltage limits are non-binding at all buses at an optimal
solution, then (14b) further yields µv,?
k
= 0 for each k. Then,
(22) implies
MS =
m∑
k`=1
µ?k`fk` +
n∑
k=1
µv,?k vk ≥ 0.
The inequality follows from the nonnegativity of each term in
each summand, completing the proof.
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W := {(pe,pe′ , qe, qe′ ,w) | pk` = Tr(Φk`W ), p`k = Tr(Φ`kW ), qk` = Tr(Ψk`W ), q`k = Tr(Ψ`kW ),
wk = Tr(1k1TkW ) for some W  0 for k ∈ N, k → ` ∈ E}.
(23)
X := {(pe,pe′ , qe, qe′ ,w) | pk` = Pk`, p`k = rk`Jk` − Pk`, qk` = Qk`, q`k = xk`Jk` −Qk`,
w` = wk − 2(Pk`rk` +Qk`xk`) + (r2k` + x2k`)Jk`, P 2k` +Q2k` ≤ Jk`wk, wk ≥ 0
for some P ,Q,J for k ∈ N, k → ` ∈ E}.
(24)
Fig. 4: Sets required to show equivalence of PSDP and PSOCP on radial power networks.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
PSDP can be written as
minimize
n∑
k=1
ck(p
G
k , q
G
k ),
subject to pGk − pDk =
∑
`′:k→`′
pk`′ +
∑
`′:`′→k
pk`′ ,
qGk − qDk =
∑
`′:k→`′
qk`′ +
∑
`′:k→`′
qk`′ ,
pk` ≤ fk`, p`k ≤ fk`
pG ≤ pGk ≤ pG, qG ≤ qGk ≤ qG,
v2k ≤ wk ≤ v2k,
for k ∈ N, k → ` ∈ E,
(pe,pe′ , qe, qe′ ,w) ∈W.
(25)
The vectors pe and pe′ collect pk` and p`k for k → ` ∈ E,
respectively. Similarly, qe and qe′ collect all qk` and q`k for
k → ` ∈ E, respectively. The set W is defined in (23) in
Figure 4. From [18, Theorem 6], we have X = W, where
X is as defined in (24). Replacing W by X, (25) becomes
PSOCP. The set of optimal dual multipliers of all constraints
in (25) save the last one then remain the same upon replacing
W by X, making the prices from PSDP and PSOCP equal.
